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Ney: Traveling Expenses to Temporary Job Sites

TRAVELING EXPENSES TO TEMPORARY JOB SITES
KOHR v. UNITED STATES
WALRAVEN v. COMMISSIONER
The issue addressed in this update is the current status of the deductibility of
traveling expenses to temporary job sites. The analysis is a comparison of two recent
cases: Kohr v. United States Iand Walraven v. Commissioner.' Kohr involves the
granting of a summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer from the District Court. In
Walraven, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a Tax Court ruling in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Both cases involve construction workers who maintained residences that were
considerable distances from their employment. Both were employed at a nuclear
power plant construction project, and both claimed a deduction for travel and/or
living expenses incurred while away from their residences. In both cases, the
taxpayers asserted that the deductions were valid because their jobs were of a
temporary nature.
THE LAW

The relevant statutory provisions are Internal Revenue Code Sections 162(a)3
and 262. 4 Generally, the Internal Revenue allows no deductions for living and travel
expenses incurred while going to and from work because they are considered to be
personal expenses under Section 262. 5 An exception to this rule is to allow a
deduction under the general language of Section 162(a). A deduction is allowed if
the expenses are "ordinary and necessary" and incurred while "carrying on a trade
or business." 6 In cases such as Kohr and Walraven, expenses incurred while
traveling to a distant job site are subject to a "temporary or indefinite" test to
determine deductibility. 7 Simply stated, there is a deduction for expenses incurred
while traveling from the residence to the place of "temporary" employment, but
there is no deduction when the employment is of indefinite duration. This test has
historically rejected any consideration of the subjective intentions of the taxpayer
and centered solely on the job itself.8
'Kohr v. United States, 655 F.Supp. 306 (M.D.Pa. 1987).
2
Walraven v. Commissioner, 815 F.2d 1246 (8th Cir. 1987).
328 U.S.C. Sec. 162(a) provides in part, "In general - There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
"
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business ....
this
chapter,
no
deduction
shall
as
otherwise
expressly
provided
in
U.S.C.
Sec.
262
provides,
"Except
426
be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
5
Expenses incurred in commuting are personal because they result from the taxpayer's desire to maintain his
residence at a place other than where his employer's business was located. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326
U.S. 465 (1946).
6(a).
7

Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 60 (1958).
'Frederick v. United States, 603 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1979).
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COMPARISON OF THE CASES

As previously stated, both the Kohr and Walraven cases had many similarities,
but had different outcomes for the taxpayer. Although the results were correct in both
cases, but the opinion in the Kohr case appears to break new ground for the
"temporary or indefinite" test.
The result was probably correct in each case because the courts require that the
analysis be made from the totality of the circumstances of the particular case. If the
facts of the taxpayer's situation indicate that it is reasonable for the taxpayer to
believe that the employment is only for a temporary period, then the choice to
maintain a residence away from the job site is not a personal choice but a business
choice.' 0 In Walraven, the Tax Court concluded that it was not reasonable for the
taxpayer to believe that his employment was temporary." The court based its
decision on a narrow set of facts. The project was large, the taxpayer was aware of
extensions in the project and the taxpayer turned down short-term jobs near his
residence. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit determined that this ruling was "not clearly
erroneous" 12 and that "it reasonably appeared that there was a high probability for
the job to continue indefinitely."' 3 The court affirmed the disallowance of the

deductions.

'4

In Kohr, the facts were different. The taxpayer was working on a project that
was under the constant threat of termination. Also, the taxpayer was working outside
of his union's jurisdiction and could have lost his job at any time to anyone from the
local union that wanted it. For these reasons it was reasonable for the taxpayer to
conclude that his employment was temporary.
At this point, a difference between the cases emerges. In Kohr, the court noted
a relevant point: the taxpayer had represented that his economic and family ties with
his town were strong and that he "continued to seek out jobs in his local union's
9

Peurifoy, 358 U.S. at 61.
1The Eighth Circuit in Frederick explained the test: "[T]he temporary or indefinite test serves a similar
function in the § 162(a) context in attempting to discern whether transportation expenses were incurred for
a business purpose rather than a personal one. The underlying premise in both situations is the idea that a
taxpayer's choice of residence is circumscribed by his expected term of employment. A taxpayer has
considerable discretion in determining where he wants to live when he will be employed in a location for a
substantial or indefinite period of time. This discretion is severely limited or nonexistent when a taxpayer will
be employed for only a short or temporary period of time. Thus, the choice of a residence is a personal decision
in the first situation, and a business decision in the latter." Frederick, 603 F.2d at 1295.
"Walraven v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M.(P-H) 855, 858 (1986).
' 2Walraven, 815 F.2d at 1248.'
3

1 1d.
4

1 d.
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jurisdiction shows this continuingdesire," 5to remain in his hometown. This would
seem to indicate that the taxpayer's desire to retain his residence is a factor the courts
should consider. This idea was specifically rejected in Walraven 6 and other prior
cases.' 7 In Walraven, the court stated that any consideration of the "taxpayer's
personal expectations and intentions with respect to his employment would miss the
point of the test." 8 The "temporary or indefinite test" focuses on the job itself and
its expected duration.' 9 Facts are only relevant as they relate to "the taxpayer's
expectation for continued employment." 2"

CONCLUSION

The current status of the law in this area is that there is a deduction for expenses
incurred while traveling to a temporary workplace. If the expenses are to qualify for
the deduction, then it must be reasonable for the taxpayer to believe that his
employment is temporary. In making this determination, notwithstanding the
taxpayer's "continuing desire" as cited in Kohr, the court will not consider the
taxpayer's subjective intent or expectations.
Any such subjective intent would "miss the point of the test," therefore, the
language in Kohr probably will not garner much judicial clout. Reliance on
subjective intent will probably show up in situations, such as inKohr,where the court
had more than enough objective facts to determine that the employment was
temporary. In such a case, as in Kohr, "reliance" upon subjective facts would
probably be cumulative, or conclusory, if not superfluous.
JOHN NYE

5

1

Kohr, 655 F.Supp. at 310, (Emphasis added).

'6 Walraven, 815
7
See Frederick,
v. United States,
'sWalraven, 815

F.2d at 1248.
603 F.2d at 1295; Weiberg v. Commissioner, 639 F.2d 434, 437 (8th Cir. 1981); Ellwein
778 F.2d 506, 510 (8th Cir. 1985).
F.2d at 1248; see also Cockrell v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 504, 506-507 (8th Cir. 1963).

"Frederick, 603 F.2d at 1295.
ld at 1295-96.
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